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LIMITED ARMED CONFLICT CAUSING PHYSICAL
DAMAGE TO NEUTRAL COUNTRIES:
QUESTIONS OF LIABILITY
The Iran-Iraq Armed Conflict1 created one of the worst oil pol-
lution disasters of all time.2 Iraqi jets severely damaged Iran's
Nowruz off-shore oil fields in the Persian Gulf, and as a result the
wells in production there spilled thousands of barrels of oil into the
Gulf every day.3 No country was able to cap the wells nor start
clean-up activities because of the continued fighting between Iran
and Iraq.4 To date neither country has claimed liability for the spill;'
consequently, the ecological life of the Persian Gulf is slowly being
put to death. This is evidenced by the unusual amount of dead fish
and other sea life being washed up on coastal beaches.6 Further-
more, many coastal States have been running short of fresh water due
to the oil pollution which has contaminated their de-salination
plants.7 In sum, as a result of the conflict between Iran and Iraq, the
neutral coastal states of the Persian Gulf have been severely damaged
by oil pollution.'
Liability for the oil spill disaster would seemingly be governed
by the laws of armed conflict, based on the fact that the damage arose
out of the Iran-Iraq Armed Conflict. This body of law, however,
does not apply to physical damage to neutral countries caused by
warring nations.9 The laws of neutrality would also seem to apply to
the damaged coastal nations. Yet this body of law renders a nation
responsible for the physical damage it causes to neutral nations only
1. The war between Iran and Iraq broke out in early September 1980, when Iran
launched a major offensive and recaptured Khorramsharhr. The conflict has continued to the
present, only temporarily subdued by the turmoil in Lebanon. The war between the two na-
tions is not of recent origin, but rather is the latest manifestation of a century old religious
conflict. For an extensive analysis of the Iran-Iraq conflict, see ISMAEL, IRAQ AND IRAN-
ROOTS OF CONFLICT (1982).
2. US. Expert Says Persian Gulf Oil Slick is the Worst Spill He's Ever Witnessed, Wall St.
J., Aug. 4, 1983, at 29, col. 4.
3. Persian Gulf Nations Worry as Oil Spill Goes on Unchecked, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10,
1983, at 4, col. 3.
4. Gulf Clashes Imperil Oil Spill Cleanup, N.Y. Times, April 3, 1984, at 18, col.4.
5. N.Y. Times, supra note 3.
6. Begley, Death of the Persian Gulf, NEWSWEEK, July 25, 1983, at 79.
7. Wall St. J., supra note 2.
8. Red, Boots, Coots, and Toots, NEWSWEEK, May 9, 1977, at 50.
9. See infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
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in very limited situations,'0 such as when the principal nation has a
military purpose directed at the neutral state or its conduct violates
the laws of armed conflict."
Although the laws of armed conflict and the law of neutrality
fail to afford the neutral coastal nations of the Persian Gulf any rem-
edy, these States might be able to obtain relief on the basis of judicial
decisions, treaties or conventions.'" Generally, these sources of law
provide that nations have a responsibility to ensure that activities
within their territory do not damage or interfere with territories
outside their own boundaries.' 3 Situations such as the Iran-Iraq
Armed Conflict, however, present issues of liability and compensa-
tion that go far beyond the scope of such peacetime laws. '4 Neutral
nations are left without a remedy, and often do not possess the neces-
sary resources to correct the damage they have sustained.
If neutral countries are left without a remedy in this type of situ-
ation, they may be encouraged to resort to hostilities for redress.15
Thus, the lack of a peaceful means of compensation could lead to
escalation of existing conflicts, or the creation of new ones.' 6 A dis-
cussion of this point will show the significance of the problem in the
international context, and will demonstrate that a comprehensive
method of dealing with the present problems can serve to prevent or
alleviate possible armed hostilities.
This Comment will discuss the absence of liability which exists
when a neutral State is physically damaged by limited armed con-
flict,' 7 as illustrated by the Iran-Iraq Armed Conflict. This analysis
will first explore the factual problems existing in the Persian Gulf
and the serious dilemma confronting the coastal nations bordering
that body of water. A review of the laws of armed conflict regarding
the "treatment of property" will follow. These rules will be applied
to the situation in the Gulf and to other instances where neutral na-
tions are damaged by armed conflict. The discussion of these laws
will reveal that they do not adequately address such situations. The
use of judicial decisions, treaties and conventions for the purposes of
establishing liability and responsibility to neutral nations damaged by
10. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
16. Id.
17. Limited armed conflict situations are those in which only a few nations are involved.
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limited armed conflict will then be explored. This analysis will
demonstrate that the use of such means as a remedy has increased in
recent years, although these methods still fail to address adequately
questions of liability and compensation. In view of the unavailability
of a remedy under current principles of international law, this Com-
ment will propose that a United Nations Resolution or an interna-
tional agreement should be developed to address the present
problem. The resolution would render nations involved in limited
armed conflict liable for the physical damage they cause to neutral
nations. It is hoped that such a resolution would be accepted as a
rule of customary international law.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSIAN GULF OIL SPILL
In February 1983, a platform of the Nowruz off-shore oil field
collapsed' 8 and oil began leaking into the Gulf.'9 The damage was
amplified when Iraqi jets and helicopters hit additional platforms in
March and again in July.20 The coastal States threatened by the huge
oil spill which ensued were Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qutar, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.2 These coastal nations,
which are neutral in the Gulf war, assembled technical teams to cap
the spilling wells.22 Iran, however, would not guarantee safe conduct
for the technicians unless Iraq paid fifty billion dollars in reparations
and made a formal apology.23 Iran was content to let the oil slick
threaten the Gulf states that bankroll Iraq's war effort.24 Iraq, on the
other hand, would not accept a cease-fire unless Iran agreed to a
broader and more realistic set of terms. 25 Unfortunately, this stale-
mate prevented the technicians from capping the wells, and conse-
quently the spill increased in size.26
On May 7, 1983, Iran and Iraq met with other Persian Gulf
nations to discuss ways to control the great oil slick threatening their
coasts.27 Both Iran and Iraq agreed that the wells had to be capped,
18. The Nowruz off-shore oil field is located in the Persian Gulf, adjacent to the country
of Iran. In February 1983 a platform collapsed which in no way was attributable to the Iran-
Iraq Armed Conflict. See Begley, supra note 6.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. N.Y. Times, supra note 4.
22. Id.
23. The Midas Touch in the Persian Gulf, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1983, at 5, col. 6.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. N.Y. Times, supra note 3.
27. Mitchell, The Slick in the War Zone, McClean's, Apr. 18, 1983, at 33. As a result of
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but neither would accept responsibility for the task.28 Iranian offi-
cials contended that the country responsible for creating the pollu-
tion was liable, while Iraq asserted that the owners of the wells were
the responsible parties.29 No compromise was reached, and the
armed conflict between Iran and Iraq continued to be the sole reason
for the ongoing spill of oil into the Persian Gulf.
The ecological disasters resulting from the oil spill are of great
proportions. The spill has affected three main areas in the Gulf: (1)
the sea life, (2) the Gulf waters, and (3) the coastal nations' de-salina-
tion plants.
An international ecological society has reported that the sea life
in the Gulf is rapidly dying.30 The report indicated that an unusual
amount of dead fish, turtles, dolphins, snakes and birds are washing
up on Gulf beaches.3 Furthermore, the heat in the Gulf area has
caused about fifty percent of the oil to evaporate. This has resulted in
a sludge residue which eventually forms into tar and falls to the bot-
tom of the Gulf.32 Biologists are unsure that current technology can
remove these "tar balls," and consequently fear that the Gulf waters
may be irreversibly contaminated.33
The most serious effect on the neutral coastal nations is the pol-
lution of their de-salination plants. 34  These plants provide fresh
water to the populations of the coastal States and their industrial sec-
tors by removing the salt from water taken from the Gulf.3" None of
the endangered nations have sufficient sources of fresh water to en-
sure the survival of their populations without help from the
the damage to the oil platform, some four thousand to five thousand barrels of oil flowed into
the Gulf each day. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. The World Wildlife Fund, founded in 1961, reported that the Persian Gulf was so
severely damaged by the oil spill that essentially all the life in the Gulf was either dead or
rapidly dying. Begley, supra note 6. The U.S. based conservation society is supported by con-
tributions from individuals, funds, corporations and foundations. The Fund seeks to protect
the biological resources upon which human survival depends. The emphasis is on preservation
of endangered and threatened species of wildlife, plants and habitats, and natural areas any-
where in the world. Activities are scientifically based, and aim to produce immediate and long-
term conservation benefits and provide models for natural management techniques and poli-
cies. The Fund maintains a library of 1500 volumes, which is located at 1601 Connecticut
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threatened de-salination plants.3 6 A United States expert on oil rig
accidents37 summed up the situation in the Persian Gulf by stating
that "the giant Iranian oil slick that has been polluting the Persian
Gulf for the past seven months ranks among the world's largest and
most difficult oil pollution problems and it's the biggest and probably
the worst thing I've ever seen.",
38
The damage in the Gulf is too extensive for the neutral coastal
States to physically and financially handle alone. If the problem is to
be rectified, responsibility will eventually have to be taken for the oil
spill and its effects upon the coastal Gulf States. However, the fact
that the damage arose from an armed conflict situation raises serious
doubts as to the liability of the States who have created the situation.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: How IT
APPLIES TO ADVERSE PHYSICAL EFFECTS UPON
NEUTRAL NATIONS
International law attaches responsibilities to nations engaged in
armed aggression. These laws were developed in several interna-
tional conventions which delineate the responsibilities and liabilities
of nations engaged in war. The provisions of these conventions have
undergone considerable changes since World War II." The most
significant changes arose with the conclusion of the Geneva Conven-
tion in 1949, 0 which rendered the conventional laws of war applica-
ble to armed conflict situations.4' Article Two of the Geneva
Convention states that "the provisions will apply to all cases of de-
clared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between two
or more of the high contracting parties, even if the state of war is not
36. Wall St. J., supra note 2.
37. Paul Neal "Red" Adair, now 68 years old, has a global monopoly in the occupation of
taming runaway oil wells. "Red" Adair learned the business of stomping out oil well fires from
the man who invented the procedure, Myron Kinley. Paul Adair is a living legend of the oil
age. NEWSWEEK, supra note 8.
38. Wall St. J., supra note 2.
39. See generally II G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT (1968).
40. The application of the laws of war to an armed conflict situation began due to the
increasing number of non-traditional armed aggressions. Traditional declarations of war were
either not utilized or they were not recognized. Thus, the international conventions decided
that for some situations the laws of war were no longer applicable, and the subject was better
described as the Law of Armed Conflict. These changes enabled the traditional laws of war to
cover many armed aggressions that were previously under no type of control. See
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 39, at 1.
41. Id.
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recognized by one of them."42
Under international law, an armed conflict situation is deemed
to arise when a breach of the peace has been committed.43 A breach
of the peace is defined as any threat to the peace or an act of armed
aggression. 4 The conflict between Iran and Iraq satisfies the require-
ments of a breach of the peace because the countries are actively par-
ticipating in an armed aggression which threatens the stability and
peace of the Gulf area. Invoking the international law of armed con-
flict in a breach of the peace situation is based on the theory that the
consequences of the aggression are not limited to the principle na-
tions involved, but affect the entire world.45 Thus, the laws of armed
conflict render nations which are involved in armed aggression re-
sponsible for the physical damage their hostilities have caused to neu-
tral nations.46 In order to determine whether the laws of armed
conflict adequately address the problems that neutral Persian Gulf
nations are facing as a result of the Iran-Iraq Armed Conflict, it is
necessary to analyze the relevant provisions of the Hague Regula-
tions of 1907. 47 These provisions, under the heading of "treatment of
property," distinguish the treatment of public property and cultural
property.48
A. Public Property
In relation to public property, the Hague Regulations make a
distinction between movable and immovable State property. 49 The
basis for this distinction is that movable State property can easily be
used for military purposes and thus can be a threat to the occupying
power if left behind.5° On the other hand, immovable State property
has little to no military value. Since such property poses little or no
threat, its destruction would be senseless.
51
42. Id.
43. Id. at 97.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 485.
46. Id.
47. E. FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCU-
PATION 51 (1942).
48. Id. The laws with regard to physical effects on nations are under the heading of
"treatment of property," and are contained in Articles 53 through 56 of the Hague Regulations
of 1907.
49. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 39, at 247.
50. II L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISPUTES WAR AND NEUTRALITY 414
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Movable State property that a nation is permitted to seize or
destroy under the Hague Regulations is that which can be used solely
for military purposes.5 2 Specific items listed under Article 53 are
"cash, funds and realizable securities which are strictly the property
of the State, depots of arms, means to transport, stores and sup-
plies."5 3 Immovable State property is covered under Article 55,
which in essence renders the occupying nations an administrator of
the public buildings.54 In addition, the occupying State must adhere
to the rules of usufruct 5 in relation to buildings, real estate, forests,
and agricultural estates. 56 One exception to the necessity of adhering
to the rules of usufruct is the situation involving property damaged
or destroyed through military necessity. 7
The laws regarding the treatment of public property are detailed
and provide helpful guidelines for nations engaged in armed conflict
situations. Nonetheless, a major drawback to the Hague Regulations
of 1907 is that it only applies to the destruction of enemy property. 58
Since the Iran-Iraq situation affecting the neutral Gulf States did not
involve the destruction of enemy property, the neutral States can not
apply Article 55 of the Hague Regulations.
B. Cultural Property
Article 56 of the Hague Regulations protects cultural property
against all seizure, destruction, or wilful damage from acts of armed
conflict.59 Institutions dedicated to religion, charity, education and
the arts and sciences fall within the definition of cultural property, as
do historic monuments and works of art or science.'
The laws regarding cultural property, like the law regarding
public property, pertain only to the destruction of enemy property.
6 1
This means that in a situation where an armed conflict damages cul-
tural property belonging to a neutral nation, Article 56 of the Hague
Regulations will not be available as a source of redress for the dam-
aged State. Therefore, neutral nations not involved in the armed
52. Id.
53. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 47, at xi.
54. Id. at 55.
55. The Laws of Usufructuary limit the exploitation of the immovable property to the
"enjoyment of its natural and legal fruits." Id. at 247.
56. Id. at 55.
57. Id. at 56.
58. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 40, at 243.
59. Id. at 244.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 243.
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conflict can not apply the cultural property laws to the damage or
destruction that an armed conflict might inflict upon them.
C. Neutral Property
The rules applicable to neutral nations are primarily governed
by customary international law.62 The position of neutral nations
and their property in armed conflict areas has been established in the
form of a customary rule with two provisions.63 The rule states that
a nation involved in armed conflict is not responsible for accidental
injury to a neutral nation, or damage to, or the destruction of neutral
property. 64 Neutral States are defined as those States that do not
take part in armed conflicts between other States, and thereby remain
impartial.6 5
The first provision of this customary rule renders the principle
nation liable to pay damages for destruction of property belonging to
the neutral nation if the property was singled out for military use.66
The second provision renders the principle liable if its conduct is con-
trary to the laws of war. 67 The first provision is not applicable to the
situation in the Gulf since Iraq did not single the neutral States out
for military use. The attack on Iran's oil platform was for the sole
purpose of harming Iran, and the fact that the coastal nations were
also harmed was merely incidental. Moreover, the second provision
can not be applied to the conflict because the laws of war do not
render aid when property is damaged in an armed conflict situation.
The laws of armed conflict leave neutral countries without a
remedy for physical damage to their territory. However, different
bodies of law have developed to cover situations where nations have
caused adverse physical effects upon other nations in peacetime.
III. PEACETIME LIABILITY FOR ADVERSE PHYSICAL EFFECTS
UPON OTHER NATIONS
In a peacetime situation, liability for one nation's adverse effects
upon other nations is generally derived from two sources-judicial
62. Id. at 582.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. II L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISPUTES WAR AND NEUTRALITY 475
(McNair 4th ed. 1926).




California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1985], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol15/iss1/6
1985 NEUTRALS COUNTRIES DAMAGED BY LIMITED ARMED CONFLICT 169
decisions and treaties and conventions.68 The judicial decisions stem
from the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), in which claims
brought by nations are heard and advisory opinions are rendered.69
Treaties and conventions, on the other hand, are accords which are
formed through the cooperation of several nations working together
to achieve a common goal.70 An analysis of these methods will
demonstrate that they also fail to directly address the problems of
liability for adverse physical effects upon other nations.
A. Judicial Decisions
The leading case dealing with nations' responsibilities for ad-
verse effects to neutral nations is the Trail Smelter Arbitration.71 A
smelter, located in Trail, British Columbia, caused serious pollution
damage to the State of Washington by emitting sulphur dioxide
fumes.7" The United States and Canada subsequently formed a tribu-
nal to assess the problem and determine what action was appropri-
ate. 73 The tribunal decided that "Trail Smelter shall be required to
refrain from causing any damage through fumes in the State of
Washington. ' ' 74 Furthermore, the tribunal determined that:
Under the principles of international law .. .no nation has the
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another nation or
the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious conse-
quences and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence.
75
The principles of international law which were set forth in the
Trail Smelter case can be applied to the situation in the Persian Gulf.
The armed conflict between Iraq and Iran caused oil to pollute the
waters of the Gulf.76 The pollution spread, causing irreparable dam-
age to the Gulfs water and sea life.7 7 Moreover, the spill affected the
68. Comment, IXTOC : International and Domestic Remedies for Transboundary Pollu-
tion Injury, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 404, 407 (1980).
69. See infra notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 106-47 and accompanying text.
71. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 Int'l Arb. Awards 1095 (1938). For further
discussion, see J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 283 (1983).
72. Id. at 284.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 288.
75. Comment, supra note 68, at 408.
76. See supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
77. Id.
9
Weiner: Limited Armed Conflict Causing Physical Damage to Neutral Countri
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
coastal nations' fresh water supplies and fishing industries.7" The oil
slick in the Gulf clearly caused serious consequences and the injury
can be established by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, the neu-
tral nations could bring an action for damages in the I.C.J. and cite
the Trail Smelter case as precedent.
The I.C.J. has also addressed States' liability for transnational
pollution damage in the Corfu Channel case (United Kindgom v. Al-
bania).7 9 The facts established that two British ships were damaged
by mines while proceeding through the Corfu Channel. 80 The chan-
nel had previously been swept for mines,"1 and consequently no ships
could have had knowledge of the newly laid minefield.82 The United
Kingdom argued that the Straits were used for international naviga-
tion between two parts of the high seas,83 and that warships of for-
eign nations therefore had a right of passage without previous
authorization, provided that the purpose was innocent.84 Albania,
on the other hand, denied that the Straits were an international high-
way in which a right of passage existed. 5 Albania asserted that at no
time did any vessel have a right of passage through the Straits with-
out prior notification to, and permission of the Albanian
authorities.86
The I.C.J. decided that Albania was responsible for the damage
to the British ships that occurred in Albanian waters, and that Alba-
nia also had a duty to compensate the United Kingdom.87 The I.C.J.
recognized the reasoning underlying the Trail Smelter case in render-
ing its decision, and held that a nation is responsible for acts commit-
ted within its territory that have injurious effects upon foreign
nationals. 88
Judicial decisions by the I.C.J. are helpful in upholding estab-
lished rules of international law and in settling disputes. 89 However,
78. Id.
79. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1948 I.C.J. 4.
80. Id. at 15.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 10.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 11.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 36.
88. Comment, supra note 68, at 409.
89. Located at the Hague in the Netherlands, the I.C.J. is the principle judicial organ of
the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER art. 92. The Court is composed of fifteen members
elected by the General Assembly and Security Council. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
Vol. 15
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using the I.C.J. as a remedy presents problems of jurisdiction which
may be conferred upon the I.C.J. in two ways. 90 One method is by
agreement between the nations involved in the dispute. 9t There are
no formal requirements governing these agreements. 92 The I.C.J. has
deliberately kept these agreements informal to encourage States to
utilize the Court to resolve their disputes.93 Additionally, jurisdic-
tion may be conferred through unilateral declaration. 94 Many na-
tions have declared that they recognize compulsory jurisdiction of
the I.C.J. in certain legal disputes95 such as (1) the interpretation of a
treaty; (2) any question of international law; (3) the existence of any
fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an interna-
tional obligation; and (4) the nature or extent of the reparation to be
made for the breach of an international obligation.96 Most of the
declarations made by nations, however, accept compulsory jurisdic-
tion in an extremely restricted manner. 97
The United Nations Charter authorizes the Security Council or
General Assembly to request the I.C.J. to issue an advisory opinion
on any legal question. 98 Advisory opinions are not binding and do
not have the force of law, 99 but are persuasive and States are unlikely
to contravene their mandates."° Advisory opinions of the I.C.J. are
COURT OF JUSTICE. art 3 [hereinafter cited as I.C.J. STATUTE]. No two members may be from
the same country. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 3.
The I.C.J. is open to all States which are parties to the I.C.J. Statute, and is competent to
adjudicate all legal claims. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 35. States which are not members of the UN
may litigate in the I.C.J. if they accept the conditions set out by the General Assembly on the
recommendations of the Security Council. All States which are memebers of the UN are also
parties to the I.C.J. Statute. G. ELIAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF LAW 45 (1971).
The Court applies international conventions, international customs and general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 38. To a limited extent, the Court
will also consider other judicial decisions and scholarly writings. I.C.J. STATUTE arts. 38 and
59.
90. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 60.




95. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 36(2).
96. See generally DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 345-416 (S.
Rosenne ed. 1979).
97. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 36(2).
98. ROSENNE, supra note 91, at 82-83.
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 96. Article 96 also authorizes "other organs of the United Na-
tions and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assem-
bly" to request advisory opinions on legal questions arising out of the scope of their activities.
Id.
100. D. PRATAP, THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 227
(1972).
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the opinions of the highest international tribunal,""' and the moral
weight and influence they carry is significant. 0 2 The international
court itself has treated advisory opinions as having authority equal to
judgments. 1
0 3
Although the I.C.J. is a powerful tool for resolving international
problems, the Court has severe limitations."4 The strongest of these
limitations is that the I.C.J. only has the power to give opinions; and
therefore, even if a nation consents to the jurisdiction of the Court,
there is no conventional means of enforcement.' 05 Considering these
limitations on the I.C.J., the likelihood of that body actually hearing
the Gulf States' claim is slight. Furthermore, even if the I.C.J. were
to hear the case and hand down an opinion, the coastal nations
would have no means of enforcing the decision. Hence, it is highly
unlikely that the Iran-Iraq dispute will be settled by the I.C.J., and
the neutral States of the Gulf must look to a treaty or a convention
for a remedy for their damages.
B. Treaties and Conventions
United Nations Conferences, coupled with multilateral agree-
ments, are the source for many of the existing principles of national
responsibility in international law. 106 In particular, conferences and
agreements regarding environmental and political concerns consti-
tute much of the body of law governing States' responsibility applica-
ble to the Persian Gulf situation.
One such treaty that has particular application to the Persian
Gulf is the Kuwait Regional Conference for Co-operation on the
Protection and Development of the Marine Environment and the
Coastal Areas From Pollution.0 7 The treaty provisions in Article
III set forth an obligation for signatories to take appropriate meas-
ures to prevent pollution in the Gulf.'08 These obligations include
101. International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128. For example, although
South Africa has often refused to implement the Court's opinions, it generally refrains from
complete defiance. PRATAP, supra note 100, at 231.
102. PRATAP, supra note 100, at 231.
103. Id.
104. Comment, supra note 68, at 413.
105. Id. at 416.
106. I. BROWNLIE, A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY RULES OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION 9 (1974).
107. The Kuwait Regional Conference for Co-operation on the Protection and Develop-
ment of the Marine Environment in the Coastal Areas from Pollution, reprinted in 17 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 501 (1978).
108. Id. at 513. Article III provides that:
Vol. 15
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establishing national standards, laws and regulations to assure the
effective implementation of the Convention. °9 Furthermore, under
this Convention contracting States shall cooperate with international
and regional organizations in the fields of scientific research, moni-
toring and assessment concerning pollution in the Gulf area.' Obli-
gations of signatories in regard to the fight against pollution
emergencies are set forth in Article IX."' Contracting States are
required to take whatever steps necessary to deal with a pollution
situation in the sea area, which includes providing adequate equip-
ment and personnel."I 2 In the event that a dispute arises in the inter-
pretation of the Convention, the Signatories are to seek a settlement
through negotiation or other peaceful means.' 3 If a settlement can-
not be reached, the dispute is to be decided by a judicial commission
General Obligations
(a) The Contracting States shall, individually and/or jointly, take all appropriate
measures in accordance with the present Convention and those protocols in force to
which they are party to prevent, abate and combat pollution of the marine environ-
ment in the Sea Area;
(b) In addition to the Protocol concerning regional Co-operation in Combating Pol-
lution by Oil and other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency opened for signa-
ture at the same time as the present Convention, the Contracting States shall co-
operate in the formulation and adoption of other protocols prescribing agreed meas-
ures, procedures and standards for the implementation of the Convention;
(c) The Contracting States shall establish national standards, laws and regulations as
required for the effective discharge of the obligation prescribed in Paragraph (a) of
this article, and shall endeavor to harmonize their national policies in this regard and
for this purpose appoint the appropriate Authority;
(d) The Contracting States shall co-operate with the competent international, re-
gional and sub-regional organizations to establish and adopt regional standards, rec-
ommended practices and procedures to prevent, abate and combat pollution from all
sources in fulfilling their obligations under the present Convention;
(e) The Contracting States shall use their best endeavour to ensure that the imple-
mentation of the present Convention shall not cause transformation of one type of
pollution to another which could be more detrimental to the environment.
109. Id.
110. Id.
11l. Id. at 515. Article IX provides that:
Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution Emergencies
(a) The contracting States shall, individually and/or jointly, take all necessary meas-
ures, including those to ensure that adequate equipment and qualified personnel are
readily available, to deal with pollution emergencies in the Sea Area, whatever the
causes of such emergencies, and to reduce or eliminate damage resulting therefrom;
(b) Any contracting State which becomes aware of any pollution emergency in the
Sea Area shall, without delay, notify the Organization referred to under Article XVI
and, through the secretariat, any Contracting State likely to be affected by such
emergency.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 523. Article XXV provides that:
Settlement of Disputes
(a) In a case of a dispute as to the interpretation or application of this Convention or
its protocols, the Contracting States concerned shall seek a settlement of the dispute
through negotiations or any other peaceful means of their own choice.
(b) If the Contracting States concerned cannot settle the dispute through the means
mentioned in paragraph (a) of this Article, the dispute shall be submitted to the Judi-
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set up by the Convention.' 1 4 However, in a situation involving war-
ships or other non-commercial governmental service, a State that vio-
lates the provisions of the Convention shall be exempt from the
application of its provisions." 5 Thus, Iran and Iraq can assert they
are exempted from the Convention's provisions because their hostili-
ties which caused the oil pollution damage are non-commercial gov-
ernmental acts.
The United Nations position in regard to environmental damage
has been promulgated in The United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment. The Conference sets forth nations' responsi-
bility for environmental damage to areas beyond their territories.'
16
Articles 21 and 22 are pertinent to the present problem in that the
United Nations has established that States have a responsibility to
ensure that the activities within their jurisdiction do not cause dam-
age to areas beyond their boundaries.11 ' Under these provisions,
Iran and Iraq have a responsibility not only to control the environ-
mental damage they have caused, but also to compensate the victims
of the environmental damage.""
Article 21 provides that nations have a right to exploit their nat-
ural resources, although they also have a duty to control their activi-
ties with regard to these resources so that they do not damage areas
beyond their jurisdiction." 9 Article 22 asserts that nations have a
duty to promote environmental pollution laws regarding liability and
compensation for victims of pollution damage, and that nations
should cooperate in developing these laws. 12' These articles impose
cial Committee for the Settlement of Disputes referred to in paragraph (b)(iii) of Arti-
cle XVI.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 517. Article XIV provides that:
Sovereign Immunity
Warships or other ships owned or operated by a State, and used only on Government
non-commercial service, shall be exempted from the application of the provisions of
the present convention. Each Contracting State shall, as far as possible, ensure that
its warships or other ships owned or operated by that State, and used only on Govern-
ment non-commercial service, shall comply with the present Convention in the pre-
vention of pollution to the marine environment.
116. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 48/14 and Corr. 1, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1416, 1420 (1972).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. Principle 21 provides that: "States have, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."
120. Id. Principle 22 provides that: "States shall cooperate to develop further the interna-
Vol. 15
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1985], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol15/iss1/6
1985 NEUTRALS COUNTRIES DAMAGED BY LIMITED ARMED CONFLICT 175
an affirmative duty on Iran to control its activities with regard to its
oil resources in the Gulf. Since its oil resources have damaged the
neutral States in the Gulf, Article 22 demands that Iran and Iraq
cooperate in compensating victims for their damage.
The International Law Commission, in its draft articles on State
responsibility, questioned whether the articles of the United Nations
Conference established strict liability for all types of environmental
damage. 12 1 However, the Commission indicated that transnational
environmental damage was clearly among the injuries that the Con-
ference intended to include. 122 Thus, the damage inflicted by Iran
and Iraq in the Persian Gulf is clearly the type which establishes
strict international liability.
Another United Nations Conference on States' responsibility for
transnational damage is the United Nations Third Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). 123 UNCLOS III provides that a na-
tion will be responsible for damage to the marine environment when
the damage originates within its territorial boundaries and affects ar-
eas outside of its boundaries. 124  In situations where nations cannot
agree as to responsibility or liability for the damage they have caused
to the marine environment, the Convention provides an effective
remedy by establishing a code for the settlement of disputes.1 25
The Code's system for dispute settlement begins by allowing the
tional law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environ-
mental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas
beyond their jurisdiction."
121. Handl, The Environment: International Rights and Responsibilities, AM. Soc. INT'L
L. PROC. 223, 229 (1980).
122. Id.
123. The Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was signed on
December 10, 1982, at Montego Bay. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Oct. 21, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122, reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1245
(1982) [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS]. For the complete list of the 140 signatories of the Final
Act, see id. at 1261.
124. "The Law of the Sea Conference establishes that, Polluters of areas (including the
marine environment) under the jurisdiction of other [nations] . . . [will be] liable to other
[nations] for such damage. The 'activities' of concern may originate on land or anywhere at
sea, including flag ship and sea bed installations, and the [nation] is responsible whether the
enterprise is public or private." D. LIVINGSTON, MARINE POLLUTION ARTICLES IN THE LAW
OF THE SEA SINGLE INFORMAL NEGOTIATING TEXT 23 (1976).
125. Sohn, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Ocean Conflicts: Does UNCLOS III Point the
Way?, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (1983). The development of the code for the settle-
ment of disputes has been one of the most important accomplishments of UNCLOS based on
the reasoning that "in the absence of an agreement on impartial third-party adjudication, the
view of one State with respect to the interpretation of the Convention cannot prevail over the
views of other Member States. Each party can claim forever that its view alone is correct, but
another party can make the same claim, resulting in an impasse." Id.
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parties, at any time before or during the proceedings, to come to a
mutual agreement.' 26 Only when the parties fail to reconcile their
dispute do the compulsory procedures of the Convention apply.
127
The parties may choose several of the available mechanisms under
the compulsory procedures for the settlement of their dispute.
28  If
the party does not choose one of the mechanisms, the State is deemed
to have chosen an arbitral tribunal procedure.' 29 All contracting
States are bound by the decision of the settlement mechanism they
have chosen and are obligated to accept its jurisdiction. 30
Although all States are obligated to abide by the settlement pro-
visions, the Code has delineated specific limitations and exceptions to
the compulsory procedures.' 3 ' In addition, the Code has provided
contracting States with the option to exclude certain categories from
the dispute settlement procedures. 32 One option allows any dispute
concerning military activities to be completely exempt from the dis-
pute settlement under the Convention. 133 Therefore, any contracting
State which has opted for the military exclusion will not be responsi-
ble for damage to the marine environment when the damage arose
out of an armed conflict situation.'34
126. Id. at 196. Part XV of the Convention contains the essential dispute settlement
provisions.
127. Gaertner, The Dispute Settlement Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea:
Critique and Alternatives to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 19 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 577, 582 (1982).
128. Id. at 582-584. The Parties have their choice of the following procedures for the set-
tlement of their disputes: 1) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Tribunal);
2) the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.); 3) an arbitral tribunal; or 4) a special tribunal for
the handling of disputes regarding fisheries, protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment, marine scientific research or navigation and pollution by vessels. Id. at 582.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 584.
131. Id. The limitations to the compulsory procedures relates to States' sovereignty within
their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Id.
132. Id. The categories which contracting States may exclude from the dispute settlement
procedures of the Convention are:
1) Disputes concerning sea boundary delimitations;
2) Disputes concerning military activities; and
3) Disputes which are being dealt with by the UN Security Council.
See also Sohn, supra note 125, at 198.
133. Sohn, supra note 125, at 198.
134. On December 7, 1982, at Montego Bay, Jamaica, Mr. Hamoud gave the nation of
Iraq's statement concerning the final draft of UNCLOS. Mr. Hamoud stated tht Iraq had
decided to sign the Convention without specifying any reservations. Third Conference on the
Law of the Sea (188th Meeting, eleventh session) at 26, A/CONF. 62/PV.188 (prov. ed. 1983).
On December 9, 1982, Mr. Mirmehdi gave the Islamic Republic of Iran's statement. Iran
voted in favor of adopting the Convention, although they chose not to be governed by the
compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions. As of the date of this article, the UNCLOS
Vol. 15
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An additional method of setting guidelines for liability in situa-
tions of transnational injury is the multilateral treaty. A model mul-
tinational treaty of great significance is the agreement of cooperation
between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States.' 35 This agreement focuses on the pollution of the marine en-
vironment by the discharge of hydrocarbons and other hazardous
substances. 136 The treaty was written in response to the catastrophe
surrounding Ixtoc I, an oil rig off the coast of Mexico that produced
the largest oil spill in history. 37 The agreement established a joint
contingency plan for "coordination of efforts to prevent, detect and
respond to any pollution incident which threatens the area of either
party."'"3 The plan operates through joint response teams that func-
tion as the principle link between the party's national detection and
response systems.' 39 The overall success or failure of the agreement
depends on each nation's good will, as the parties remain free to re-
spond to each situation that arises as they see fit."4 Thus, the possi-
bility exists that neither nation will participate to the extent of their
capabilities.' 4 ' Nevertheless, this agreement sets forth a model plan
by which nations can work with one another to cleanse and maintain
the seas. 142 However, the plan does have weaknesses, 4 3 the most
significant of which is also present in the Persian Gulf treaty.
Neither agreement sets forth any procedures for establishing liability,
nor do they calculate compensation for those who have been dam-
aged."' The treaties therefore fail to afford nations an adequate
compulsory procedures have not been applied to the Armed Conflict between Iran and Iraq.
United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (191st Meeting, eleventh session) at
27, A/CONF. 62/PV. 191 (prov. ed. 1983).
135. See Barnett, Transnational Pollution Agreement Regarding Marine Pollultion Agree-
ments Between the U.S. and Mexico, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 177 (1982).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 178. Ixtoc I is located in the Bay of Campeche, which is in the southwestern
part of the Gulf of Mexico. The oil rig blew out on June 3, 1979, and was spilling oil and
natural gas at the rate of some thirty thousand barrels per day. The spill traveled more than
five hundred nautical miles, eventually washing up on a one hundred and forty mile stretch of
the Texas Coast. Mexico was able to cap the well on March 22, 1980, but not before three
million barrels of oil escaped. 2 INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 841 (Oct. 12, 1979).
138. Barnett, supra note 135, at 180.
139. Id. at 181.
140. Id. at 184.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 182.
143. Id. at 183.
144. Id. at 184. A more thorough analysis of the inadequacy of current international and
national laws on compensation to victims of oil spills appears in de Mestral, The Protection of
the Marine Environment Arising from Off-Shore Mining and Drilling, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 469
(1979).
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remedy.
The overall impact of international conventions and multilateral
agreements is that States' responsibility has significantly increased
over the last fifty years.145 Nations currently regard environmental
protection as a high priority, and therefore are generally willing to
cooperate with others in taking responsibility for environmental
damage.' 4 6 Nonetheless, the question of liability and compensation
for damaged parties has generally remained ignored.
147
IV. PROPOSAL
A. The Need for a New Instrumentality
Neutral nations physically damaged by armed conflict have little
or no remedy through the laws of armed conflict.' 4 8 Furthermore,
the fact that the damage arose from an armed conflict situation limits
peacetime remedies, as these measures do not generally address the
question of liability.'4 9 Therefore, neutral nations are left without
legal recourse when physically damaged by the effects of an armed
conflict. A remedy must be afforded the neutral States in the Gulf
and other nations faced with the same problem now or in the future.
The basis for establishing such a remedy is twofold.
First, a nuclear world war has the capability of causing severe
destruction. 5 ° Thus, civilized nations have been committed to
avoiding a nuclear conflict since the end of World War II.'' This
situation has led to the almost routine occurrence of "limited" armed
conflicts as States have sought alternative ways to air aggressions. 1
52
Between 1945 and 1970, there were one hundred separate armed con-
flicts between various nations. 5 3 This increase in limited armed con-
flict indicates anl increase in the possibility of neutral countries which
may be adversely affected by such hostilities.
Second, a remedy must be afforded States affected by limited
armed conflict that will enable those States to remain neutral. Where
145. Comment, supra note 68, at 410.
146. Id.
147. Barnett, supra note 135, at 185.
148. See supra notes 39-67 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 68-144 and accompanying text.
150. Firmage, The "War of National Liberation" and the Third World, in LAW AND CIVIL
WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 304-305 (J.N. Moore ed. 1974).
151. Id.
152. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by
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inadequate legal remedies for neutral States exist it becomes increas-
ingly possible that these States will resort to aggression for redress.
As the threat to neutral States from limited armed conflict increases,
the possibility of global hostility increases. A remedy for neutral
States affected by limited armed conflict is a step toward discourag-
ing the escalation of hostilities. In order to prevent escalation of such
conflicts, nations involved in limited armed conflict situations must
be made liable for physical damage they cause to neutral nations.
The laws of armed conflict can incorporate this idea through a
United Nations resolution or an international convention. The prin-
ciple behind the laws of armed conflict is that nations should be held
responsible for the adverse effects which their conflicts have on other
nations. ' Thus, it is consistent with the underlying principles of the
law of armed conflict that this responsibility should also attach for
acts committed during armed conflicts as well as declared wars.
Moreover, the implementation of a proposal embodying these princi-
ples through a United Nations resolution or through an international
convention can be achieved since the most important developments
in the law of armed conflict have been accomplished through the use
of these methods.1
55
The shortcomings of these methods, namely inadequate treat-
ment of liability and compensation issues, can be avoided. The first
step is to provide a specific method for resolving issues of liability
and compensation. This can be accomplished through the institution
of a "Limited Armed Conflict Tribunal" to hear and settle all dis-
putes arising from situations analogous to that in the Gulf.'56 Such a
tribunal could provide neutral nations with a mechanism for the set-
tlement of their disputes and thus lessen the likelihood of resort to
hostilities for redress.
It is crucial that the proposal eventually be accepted as a rule of
customary international law, that is, a "basic norm" of society that
has a binding effect on all nations. 157 A United Nations resolution or
international convention, on the other hand, generally only binds its
signatories, and therefore very few translate into universal
adherence. 1
58
Customary rules of international law are created as a matter of
154. See supra text accompanying note 46.
155. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 50, at 226.
156. See infra § B for the proposed UN resolution on amending the current Laws of
Armed Conflict to include situations like the one in the Persian Gulf.
157. J.G. MERILLS, ANATOMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (1981).
158. Id. at 8.
179
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international agreement. 5 9 This agreement process is accomplished
by several States binding themselves to United Nations Resolutions
or international agreements. 60 These Member States then interact
with non-Member States, eventually rendering the new resolution or
agreement a law of general usage, which in turn becomes a rule of
customary international law.' 6 ' States recognize these rules of cus-
tomary international law in their relationships with one another and
normally adhere to them.' 62 To disregard a rule of customary inter-
national law is to upset the established norms "for which a high
political price must usually be paid"' 6 3 by way of political and eco-
nomic sanctions. 1
64
It is unreasonable to expect that even if a proposal is accepted as
a rule of customary international law it will eliminate all future
problems that might arise. International law is an instrument of so-
cial control, and thus does not operate in a vacuum.' 65 Moreover,
customary international law has no conventional means of enforce-
ment; each individual nation must uphold or disregard its princi-
ples. 166 Nevertheless, nations must bind themselves to a United
Nations resolution or an international agreement if neutral States are
to have a mechanism to remedy their damages. If this is achieved,
nations participating in a limited armed conflict in the future will
have prior knowledge of their international responsibilities to neutral
nations, and may be more inclined to act accordingly. It is essential
that the community work toward narrowing the presently existing
gaps in the law of armed conflict, "for in an anarchic and lawless
world, it is not only the weak who lose, but everyone is a loser, in-
cluding those who are the most powerful. In the process, all human-
ity loses."' 6 7
159. Id. at 3. For a complete discussion on the creation of the rules of customary interna-
tional law, see J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 397 et. seq. (H. Waldock 6th ed. 1963);
G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (1981).
160. Merills, supra note 157, at 8.
161. Id. at 14.
162. Id. at 86.
163. Id. at 88.
164. Id.
165. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 90 (1976).
166. Id. One encouraging event in modem times is the fact that one hundred and fifty
nations were willing to spend more than seven years negotiating a treaty on the Law of the Sea.
167. Nanda, US. Action in Grenada Raises Questions of International Law, Den. Post, Oct.
31, 1983, at C3, col. 1.
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B. Proposed United Nations Resolution
United Nations Resolution amending the Laws of Armed Con-
flict to include provisions covering limited armed conflict that cause
physical damage to neutral countries.
PREAMBLE
The States responsible for the present Resolution,
Realizing that the absence of liability for limited armed conflict
causing physical damage to neutral countries presents a growing
threat to the Environment, Human Health and World Peace,
Believing that the codification and progressive development of
the laws of armed conflict achieved in the present Resolution will
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, in
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations as
set forth in the Charter,
Having Regard to the Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations on Cooperation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
Affirming that the rules of customary international law continue
to govern matters not expressly regulated by the provisions of the
present Resolution,
Have Agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
Definitions
For the purpose of the Resolution:
(a) "Limited Armed Conflict Situations" are those which in-
volve a maximum of two nations, although they may include an
armed conflict situation which is located solely within one Nation or
Territory.
(b) "Principals" refer to those nations or individuals actively in-
volved in the armed conflict.
(c) "Physical adverse effects" mean any introduction by the
principals, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy which re-
sults or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to a
neutral nation, including harm to living resources and marine life,
hazards to human health, and any other type of harmful effect that
would damage a neutral nation's public or private property.
21
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(d) "Neutral nations" are those that do not take part in an
armed conflict and those that remain impartial.
ARTICLE II
General Obligations
(a) The principals shall, individually, jointly, or both, take all
appropriate measures, in accordance with the present Resolution and
those protocols in force to which they are a party, to prevent where
possible and to abate adverse physical effects upon neutral nations,
and if adverse effects are present, principals will take responsibility in
accordance with the Resolution;
(b) In addition, states shall cooperate in the formulation and
adoption of other protocols; prescribing agreed measures, procedures
and standards for the implementation of the Resolution;
(c) States shall establish national standards, laws and regula-
tions as required for the effective discharge of the obligation pre-
scribed in Paragraph (a) of this Article, and shall endeavor to
harmonize their national policies in this regard and for this purpose
appoint the appropriate authority; and
(d) States shall cooperate with the competent international, re-
gional and sub-regional organizations to establish and adopt regional
standards, recommend practices and procedures to prevent limited
armed conflict situations from causing physical damage to neutral
nations, and to assist each other in fulfilling their obligation under




States shall conform to the appropriate rules and procedures
laid down by the United Nations Tribunal, constituted in accordance
with Article VII, for the determination of:
(a) Civil liability and compensation for damage inflicted upon
neutral nations resulting from a limited armed conflict situation; and
(b) Liability and compensation for damage resulting from viola-
tion of obligations under the present Resolution.
Vol. 15
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ARTICLE IV
Settlement of Disputes
(a) In case of a dispute as to the interpretation or application of
this Resolution, the parties involved shall seek a settlement of the
dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their own
choice.
(b) If the parties involved cannot settle the dispute through
means mentioned in Paragraph (a) of this Article, the dispute shall be
submitted to The Law of Limited Armed Conflict Tribunal described
in Article VII.
ARTICLE V
Finality and Binding Force of Decisions
(a) Any decision rendered or measure prescribed by the Tribu-
nal shall be final and shall be complied with by all the parties to the
dispute.
(b) Any such decision or measure shall have no binding force




Each country shall submit to the Tribunal reports on measures
adopted in implementation of the provisions of the Resolution in
such form and at such intervals as may be determined by the
Tribunal.
ARTICLE VII
1. The Law of Limited Armed Conflict Tribunal
The Tribunal shall be constituted and shall function in accord-
ance with the provisions of the present Resolution.
(a) Composition of Tribunal
1. The Tribunal shall be composed of a body of 21 independ-
ent members elected from among persons enjoying the highest repu-
tation for fairness, integrity and competence in matters relating to
the Law of Limited Armed Conflict.
2. In the Tribunal as a whole, the representation of the princi-
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pal legal systems of the world and equitable geographical distribution
shall be assured.
(b) Election of Members
1. No two members of the Tribunal may be nationals of the
same State, and a person who for the purposes of membership in the
Tribunal could be regarded as a national of more than one State shall
be deemed to be a national of the one in which he ordinarily exercises
civil and political rights.
2. There shall be not less than three members from each geo-
graphical group as established by the General Assembly of the
United Nations.
(c) Procedure for Nomination and Election
1. Each State may nominate not more than two persons for
membership of the Tribunal.
2. At least three months before the date of the election, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, in the case of the first elec-
tion, and the Registrar of the Tribunal, in the case of subsequent
elections, shall address a written invitation to the States to submit
their nominations for members of the Tribunal within two months.
He shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all the persons thus
nominated, with an indication of the States which have nominated
them, and shall submit it to the States before the seventh day of the
last month before the date of each election.
3. The first election shall be held within six months of the date
of entry into force of the present Resolution.
4. Elections of the members of the Tribunal shall be by secret
ballot. They shall be held at a meeting of the States convened by the
Secretary-General in the case of the first election, and by a procedure
agreed to by the States in the case of subsequent elections. At that
meeting, for which two-thirds of the States shall constitute a quo-
rum, the persons elected to the Tribunal shall be those nominees who
obtain the largest number of votes and a two-thirds majority of votes
of the States present and voting, provided that such majority shall
include at least a majority of the States.
(d) Term of Office
1. The members of the Tribunal shall be elected for nine years
and may be re-elected; provided, however, that of the members
elected at the first election, the terms of seven members shall expire
at the end of six years.
2. The members of the Tribunal whose terms are to expire at
the end of the above-mentioned initial periods of three and six years
Vol. 15
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shall be chosen by lots to be drawn by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations immediately after the first election has been
completed.
3. The members of the Tribunal shall continue to perform
their duties until their places have been filled. Although replaced,
they shall finish any proceedings which they have begun at the time
of their replacement.
4. In the case of the resignation of a member of the Tribunal,
the resignation shall be addressed to the President of the Tribunal.
The position shall become vacant upon the receipt of the letter of
resignation.
(e) Vacancies
1. Vacancies shall be filled by the same method as devised for
the first election, subject to the following provision: the Registrar
shall, within one month of the occurrence of the vacancy, proceed to
issue the invitations provided for in Article IV, and the date of the
election shall be fixed by the President of the Tribunal after consulta-
tion with States.
2. A member of the Tribunal elected to replace a member
whose term of office has not expired shall hold office for the remain-
der of the term of his predecessor.
(f) Conditions Relating to Interests of Members
1. No member of the Tribunal may exercise any political or
administrative function, or associate actively with or be financially
interested in any ongoing limited armed conflict.
2. No member of the Tribunal may act as agent, counsel or
advocate in any case.
3. Any doubt on these points shall be decided by a majority of
the other members of the Tribunal who are present.
(g) Conditions Relating to Participation of Members
1. No member may participate in the decision of any case in
which he has previously taken part as agent, counsel or advocate for
one of the parties as a member of a national or international court or
in any other capacity.
2. If, for some reason, a member of the Tribunal decides that
he should not take part in the decision of a particular case, he shall so
inform the President of the Tribunal.
3. If the President considers that for some reason one of the
members of the Tribunal should not sit in a particular case, he shall
give his notice accordingly.
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4. Any disagreement as to whether a member should sit in a
particular case shall be decided by a majority vote of the other mem-
bers of the Tribunal who are present.
(h) Consequences of Ceasing to Fulfill Conditions
If, in the unanimous opinion of the other members of the Tribu-
nal, a member has ceased to fulfill the required conditions of mem-
bership, the President of the Tribunal shall declare the seat vacant.
(i) Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities
The members of the Tribunal, when engaged in the business of
the Tribunal, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.
(j) Declaration by Members
Every member of the Tribunal shall, before taking up his duties,
make a solemn declaration in open session that he will exercise his
powers impartially and conscientiously.
(k) President, Vice-President and Registrar
1. The Tribunal shall elect its President and Vice-President for
three years; they may be re-elected.
2. The Tribunal shall appoint its Registrar and may provide
for the appointment of such other officers as may be necessary.
(1) Seat of Tribunal
1. The seat of the Tribunal shall be determined by the States,
provided that the Tribunal shall have the right to sit and exercise its
functions elsewhere whenever the Tribunal considers it desirable.
2. The President and the Registrar shall reside at the seat of
the Tribunal.
(m) Quorum
All available members shall sit, but eleven members shall be re-
quired to constitute a quorum of the Tribunal.
(n) Special Chambers
1. The Tribunal may form such chambers, composed of three
or more members, as the Tribunal may deem necessary for dealing
with particular categories of disputes.
2. The Tribunal shall form a chamber for dealing with a par-
ticular dispute submitted to it if the parties so request. The composi-
tion of such a chamber shall be determined by the Tribunal with the
approval of the parties.
3. With a view to the speedy dispatch of business, the Tribunal
shall form annually a chamber composed of five members which may
hear and determine disputes by summary procedure. Two alterna-
Vol. 15186
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tive members shall be selected for the purpose of replacing members
who are unable to participate in a particular proceeding.
4. Disputes shall be heard and determined by the chambers
provided for in this Article if the parties so request.
5. A Judgment given by any of the chambers provided for in
this Article shall be considered as having been rendered by the
Tribunal.
(o) Rules of Tribunal
The Tribunal shall frame rules for carrying out its functions. In
particular, it shall lay down rules of procedure.
(p) Nationality of Members
1. Members of the nationality of any of the parties to a dispute
resulting from a limited armed conflict shall retain their right to par-
ticipate as members of the Tribunal.
2. If the Tribunal hearing on any dispute includes a member of
the nationality of one of the parties to the dispute, any other party to
the dispute may choose a person to participate as a member of the
Tribunal.
3. If the Tribunal hearing does not include a member of the
nationality of the parties, each of these parties may proceed to choose
a member as provided in Paragraph 2.
4. Should there be several parties in the same interest, they
shall, for the purpose of the preceding provisions, be recognized as
one party only. Any disagreement on this point shall be settled by
the decision of the Tribunal.
(q) Renumeration of Members
1. Each member of the Tribunal shall receive an annual allow-
ance, and for each day on which he exercises his functions he shall
also receive a special allowance, provided that in any year the total
sum payable to any member as special allowance shall not exceed the
amount of the annual allowance to that member.
2. The President shall receive a special annual allowance.
3. The Vice-President shall receive a special allowance for each
day on which he acts as President.
4. The people chosen to serve as members of the Tribunal who
are not the originally elected members of the Tribunal shall receive
compensation for each day on which they exercise their membership
functions.
5. These allowances and compensation shall be fixed periodi-
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cally at a meeting of the States, taking into account the workload of
the Tribunal. They may not be decreased during the term of office.
6. The salary of the Registrar shall be fixed at a meeting of the
States on the proposal of the Tribunal.
7. Regulations made at the meeting of the States shall fix the
conditions under which retirement pensions may be given to mem-
bers of the Tribunal and to the Registrar, and the conditions under
which members of the Tribunal and Registrar shall have their travel-
ling expenses refunded.
8. The above salaries, allowances and compensation shall be
free of all taxation.
(r) Expenses of Tribunal
1. The expenses of the Tribunal shall be borne by the States
and by the Tribunal on such terms and in such manner as shall be
decided at a meeting of the States.
2. When an entity other than a State is a party to a dispute
submitted to the Tribunal, the Tribunal shall fix the amount which
that party is to contribute toward the expenses.
(s) Parties Before Tribunal
1. States may be parties before the Tribunal.
2. Entities other than States may be parties before the Tribunal
in accordance with any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on
the Tribunal and accepted by all the parties to any dispute submitted
to the Tribunal.
(t) Access to Tribunal
The Tribunal shall be open to the States. It shall be open to
entites other than States in accordance with any other agreement
conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal and accepted by all the par-
ties to any dispute submitted to the Tribunal.
(u) Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall be comprised of all dis-
putes and applications submitted to it in accordance with the present
Resolution and all matters specifically provided for in any other
agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal.
2. Reference of Disputes Subject to Other Agreements
If all the parties to a treaty or convention already in force and
relating to the subject-matter covered by the present Resolution so
agree, any disputes relating to the interpretation or application of
Vol. 15
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such treaty or convention may, in accordance with such agreement,
be submitted to the Tribunal.
(a) Institution of Proceedings
1. Disputes may be submitted to the Tribunal, as the case may
be, either by a written application addressed by a party or parties to
the dispute, or by the notification to the registrar of any special agree-
ment between the parties to the dispute. In either case, the subject of
the dispute and the parties involved shall be indicated.
2. The Registrar shall forthwith communicate the application
to all concerned.
3. He shall also notify all States.
(b) Hearing
1. The hearing shall be under the control of the President or, if
he is not able to preside, the Vice-President, and if neither is able to
preside, the senior judge present shall preside.
2. The hearing shall be public, unless the Tribunal decides
otherwise, or unless the parties demand that the public not be
admitted.
(c) Conduct of Case
The Tribunal shall make orders for the conduct of the case, shall
decide the form and time in which each party must present its argu-
ments, and make all arrangements connected with the receiving of
evidence.
(d) Majority for Decision
1. All questions shall be decided by a majority of the members
of the Tribunal who are present.
2. In the event of an equality of votes, the President or the
member who acts in his place shall have a casting vote.
(e) Judgment
1. The judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based.
2. It shall contain the names of the members of the Tribunal
who have taken part in the decision.
3. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the
unanimous opinion of the members of the Tribunal, any member
shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion.
4. The judgment shall be signed by the President and by the
Registrar. It shall be read in open court, due notice having been
given to the parties to the dispute.
5. The judgment of the Tribunal is final and shall be complied
with by all the parties to the dispute.
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ARTICLE VIII
Entry into Force
(a) The present Resolution shall enter into force on the day fol-
lowing the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification or
accession.
(b) For each State ratifying or acceding to the Resolution after
the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession, the Resolu-
tion shall enter into force on the day after the deposit by such a State
of its instrument of ratification or accession.
ARTICLE IX
Testimonial Clause
In Witness Whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized
thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present
Resolution.
V. CONCLUSION
The armed conflict between Iran and Iraq raises several issues as
to liability for the oil pollution damage affecting neutral States in the
Persian gulf.'68 The fact that damage was caused by an armed con-
flict suggests that the laws of armed conflict should govern the situa-
tion. 169 However, these laws deal with the treatment of property and
do not cover the types of damage caused by situations such as the
Iran-Iraq conflict. 7 ' Furthermore, while mechanisms such as judi-
cial decisions and international conventions are helpful, they do not
adequately deal with the issues of liability and compensation. Conse-
quently, both alternatives leave neutral nations without an adequate
remedy.' Policy and analogous international law support the prop-
osition that principle nations should be liable for damage inflicted
upon neutral nations as a result of their limited armed conflicts, and
for compensating those nations victimized by such armed activities.
This proposal can be accomplished by the establishment of a Limited
Armed Conflict Tribunal that sets out a specific method for resolving
issues of liability and compensation, and by international recognition
of the problem and eventual acceptance of the proposal as a rule of
168. See supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 68-147 and accompanying text.
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172. See supra notes 148-67 and accompanying text.
* I would like to thank Beth A. Weiner, whose support, encouragement and assistance
made this Comment possible.
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